Desert Storm was a watershed event for space systems. Satellites, and the ground systems and people trained to control them, played a crucial role in the outcome of the conflict. Space owned the battlefield. We had a robust onorbit constellation and the inherent spacecraft flexibility to alter our operations to support specific needs of the terrestrial warfighter.
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INTRODUCTION
The deployment and employment of space systems has had a profound affect on the current and future conduct of warfare by the armed forces of the United States. Although the origins of U.S. space forces date back to the early 1960s, exploitation of these systems has been limited to force enhancement of terrestrial combat forces. The United States does not possess an ability to apply force from space, however current and future space platforms can support National Military Strategy in ways other than force enhancement. This paper examines the use of space forces as flexible deterrent options (FDO) to coerce the behavior of a potential adversary. Space forces, due to their inherent flexibility and combat enhancing functions, could prove an effective contributing FDO in conjunction with other diplomatic, economic, informational or military options. These space force FDOs should be include in future joint warfighting doctrine and made applicable to current and future joint operations.
Military strategy is the art and science of employing the armed forces of a nation to secure the objectives of national policy by application of force or the threat of force. 2 As a nation, we looked to the "threat of force" as an effective deterrent to potential aggressors; publicized to the general public (and the adversary), these movements in conjunction with informational FDOs could shape the decision making process of the potential aggressor. In the following paragraphs, we will look at three short cases where space forces in conjunction with other tools could have be used as FDOs.
SPACE FORCES AS FLEXIBLE DETERRENT OPTIONS (FDO)
9/27/2002 "Space force deployment" is the action of altering or moving space forces in order to focus maximum capabilities on an Area of Operations (AO). Although not defined in official joint warfighting doctrine, space force deployments are integral to exploiting space for joint operations. The Joint Staff Officer's Guide defines deployment as "the reallocation of forces and material to desired areas of operations." 4 We will see in the three cases below, space forces deployed from different hemispheres or focused on desired areas of operations to fit within the spirit of the joint doctrine definition. To demonstrate how these space deployments can be used as FDOs in future conflicts, we will examine these cases captured during Operations Desert
Shield and Storm. Even though the Gulf War's use is historical, the concept of deploying space forces to enhance the combat killing capability in the AO can apply to all types of space forces and across all spectrums of conflict both current and future.
Optimize Space-based Missile Warning on the Area of Operations (AO)
The ability to "see first" on the battlefield not only includes space-based missile warning but intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR). "Seeing first" attacks the enemy's element of surprise, which may eliminate their only advantage against U.S. forces. Although this section will only discuss missile warning, the premise is applicable to other space-borne ISR forces. The ability to "see first" and the enemies' knowledge of this fact eliminates the element of surprise from the enemy's cost/risk calculation. The most critical element in an adversary's tool bag against the United States is the element of surprise. The ability to mass forces undetected or launch missiles at U.S. forces is critical to the adversary's ability to seize the initiative. If the enemy loses the element of surprise, it might make they more reluctant to exposure their forces to attack. The essence of space-based warning and other reconnaissance/surveillance-type space forces is their ability to deny the enemy the element of surprise. They can become even more effective when deployed to blanket the enemy with continuous coverage thus reducing the adversary's ability to move or launch undetected.
Deployment of the DSP satellites to Southwest Asia (SWA) increased the accuracy of missile launch detections while reducing warning times to theater forces. The 50 th Space Wing (under USCINCSPACE) reoriented DSP satellites into optimal locations in order to focus maximum capability on the AO, thus enhancing our ability to detect SCUD launches. This also aided in the ability of coalition strike forces to rapidly retaliate against identified launch locations.
Air Force planners sought to increased early detection of Scud launches by deploying the DSP satellite stationed over the Indian Ocean to a westward location. Activation of SA would be unpopular with the U.S. civil community and other nations that rely upon the unadulterated GPS signal; however, our decision to enable SA in the face of international criticism would demonstrate a clear resolve and maybe force an adversary to rethink a dangerous course of action.
Optimize Military Space Communication Satellites in the Area of Operations (AO)
"Seeing first" on the battlefield is critical to decision-makers formulating policy and direction; however, guidance and orders cannot be effective executed without "hearing first."
During the Gulf War, military satellite communications was the linchpin for successful joint operations in an immature communications environment. By using military satellite communications, as well as civil, commercial, and international systems, commanders disseminate plans and orders over long distances. 10 The ability to "hear first" provides U.S. 
INFORMATION OPS AND SPACE FORCE FDOs
The three cases above are only a few space deployment options available to CINCSPACE to increase situational awareness and force enhancement. Despite these various techniques, the key to using them as FDOs rest with the ability of the U.S. government to communicate these actions to a potential adversary. Since the adversary may lack the ability to see these actions taking place, information operations/warfare and public diplomacy may be used to communicate the relevance of these deployments. 
THE RISK OF USING SPACE FORCE FDOs
Space forces and Flexible Deterrent Options are situational dependent and carry certain levels of risk in their implementation. Like all FDOs, they may not apply in every case; however, they are options available if conditions warrant. This section highlights the risk of using space forces as FDOs.
First, adversaries with demonstrated anti-satellite, counterspace or advanced denial and deception programs may use these deployments as opportunities to deny, disable or disrupt our space forces. Space forces may become a principal target of the enemy in order to eliminate the "see first and hear first" abilities of the United States. In these types of situations, openly publicizing space force deployment may not be appropriate. This can be true in many cases in which the adversary has an ability to disrupt the capability put forth.
Second, deploying space forces may require the use of non-renewable fuel, thus reducing the mission life of the space-based asset. Premature expenditure of fuel could reduce the longterm use of the satellite and increase the cost of satellite replenishment. Until satellites are developed with on-orbit refueling capabilities or unconstrained propulsion system, fuel capacities will always be a limiting factor for executing space force deployments. 3. Direct planners at all levels and commands to consider space force FDOs with other options when building joint operations plans.
CONCLUSION
"Space gives the United States more opportunities to demonstrate resolve without using force."
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Because of our increasing reliance on space-based forces to provide battlefield situational awareness and force enhancement, movement of these space forces and personnel are potential
FDOs that could also signal U.S. commitment and resolve to a potential adversary. There is a cost for moving space forces from their intended mission locations but if the resolve and commitment is great, the expenditure of fuel is worth the cost. Unlike some FDOs in which antiaccess strategies may slow terrestrial force deployments, current space superiority allows space force deployments to occur unheeded. Even though time to deploy spaces forces is limited by orbital mechanics, some situation do not require rapid repositioning of space forces to be effective. Under the right circumstances, space force FDOs should be highly publicized to provide the psychological communication to the potential adversary of our intent to remove surprise from his calculus while increase the precision and lethality of U.S. forces.
